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The current study aimed to test a Relational Frame Theory (RFT) model of analogical reasoning based
on the relating of derived same and derived difference relations. Experiment 1 recorded reaction time
measures of similar–similar (e.g., ‘‘apple is to orange as dog is to cat’’) versus different–different (e.g.,
‘‘he is to his brother as chalk is to cheese’’) derived relational responding, in both speed-contingent and
speed-noncontingent conditions. Experiment 2 examined the event-related potentials (ERPs)
associated with these two response patterns. Both experiments showed similar–similar responding to
be significantly faster than different–different responding. Experiment 2 revealed significant
differences between the waveforms of the two response patterns in the left-hemispheric prefrontal
regions; different–different waveforms were significantly more negative than similar–similar waveforms.
The behavioral and neurophysiological data support the RFT prediction that, all things being equal,
similar–similar responding is relationally ‘‘simpler’’ than, and functionally distinct from, different–
different analogical responding. The ERP data were fully consistent with findings in the neurocognitive
literature on analogy. These findings strengthen the validity of the RFT model of analogical reasoning
and supplement the behavior-analytic approach to analogy based on the relating of derived relations.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) aims to
provide a modern behavior-analytic account
of human language and cognition (see Hayes,
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001, for a book-
length review). According to the theory, the
power, richness, and complexity of human
verbal behavior may be usefully interpreted as
arbitrarily applicable relational responding.
Nonarbitrary examples of relational respond-
ing, such as identity and oddity matching, for
example, are well established in behavior
analysis (e.g., Kastak & Schusterman, 1994).
In both types of matching, the relational
response is controlled in part by the non-
arbitrary or formal relation between the
sample and comparison stimuli. Relational
frame theory argues that relational responding
may be brought under contextual control, in
that the relational responses are determined
not by the formal properties of the related
events but by additional contextual cues. For
example, if A is specified as similar to B, then
a verbally competent human may state that ‘‘B
is similar to A,’’ based on the contextual
control established by the verbal community
for the word similar. In this case, the relation of
similarity established between A and B is
applied arbitrarily (by the verbal community)
and is not determined by the physical relation
between the stimuli. Arbitrarily applicable
relational responses such as this define re-
lational frames.
According to RFT, relational frames possess
three defining behavioral properties: mutual
entailment, combinatorial entailment, and the
transformation of function (Barnes, 1994;
Hayes, 1991). Mutual entailment involves
establishing, in a given context, a particular
relation between Stimulus A and Stimulus B,
and then observing the mutually entailed
relational response between B and A. The
mutually entailed relation depends on the
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type of relation trained between A and B.
If Stimulus A bears a similar relation to B,
for example, then the relation ‘‘B is similar
to A’’ is entailed (the relation of similar is
one example of the frame of coordination;
Hayes, 1991). Trained and mutually entailed
relations are not always identical, however—
if responding to A as taller than B is trained,
for instance, then a shorter than relation may be
entailed from B to A. The second property of
a relational frame, combinatorial entailment,
is more complex than mutual entailment. If,
for example, Stimulus A bears a relation to B
and B bears a relation to C, then a relation
between A and C may be derived. Once again,
the nature of this derived relation depends on
the nature of the trained relations. If A is taller
than B and B is taller than C, for instance, then
a taller than relation between A and C is
derived by combinatorial entailment (i.e., A
is taller than C), and a shorter than relation is
entailed between C and A (i.e., C is shorter
than A). Transformation of function, the third
property of a relational frame, occurs when
a stimulus acquires a particular behavioral
function based on its derived relation to
another stimulus. If, for example, Stimulus A
is related to Stimulus B, and A acquires
a specific function, in certain contexts the
stimulus functions of B will be transformed in
accordance with the A-B relation. If A is the
opposite of B, for instance, and A evokes an
avoidance response, then B may evoke an
approach response (e.g., Whelan & Barnes-
Holmes, 2004).
Numerous studies have provided empirical
evidence to support the concept of multiple
relational frames (e.g., Dymond & Barnes,
1994, 1995, 1996; Steele & Hayes, 1991;
Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004). Relational
frame theory also makes specific predictions
about higher levels of relational complexity in
which relational frames are related to relation-
al frames, thereby producing what are referred
to as relational networks (e.g., Lipkens, 1992;
Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Lipkens,
2001; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, &
Smeets, 2001, 2002). In other words, RFT
predicts that derived relations may be related
to other derived relations (an empirical
example of such a complex relational network
will be described below). The critical point in
the context of the current research is that RFT
argues that responding in accordance with
relations between relations (hereafter referred
to as relating relations) provides the theoret-
ical basis for a functional analysis of the key
behavioral properties of analogical reasoning
(e.g., Barnes, Hegarty, & Smeets, 1997; Lip-
kens, 1992; Stewart & Barnes-Holmes, 2001;
Stewart et al., 2002).
In the first published study in this area,
Barnes et al. (1997) created an empirical
model of analogical reasoning based on re-
lating similar relations to similar relations
(described here as similar–similar relations)
and relating different relations to different
relations (termed here different–different
relations). To understand the theoretical
rationale for this work, consider the following
question: ‘‘dog is to cat as apple is to (a)
orange, or (b) snail? Assuming that ‘‘dog’’ and
‘‘cat’’ are deemed similar in the context
animal and ‘‘apple’’ and ‘‘orange’’ in the
context fruit, a language-able person might be
expected to pick orange as the correct answer.
A technical description of this response in RFT
terms would state that two derived relations of
similarity were related to each other in
accordance with a frame of coordination (see
Figure 1, upper panel). In this case, only one
generic relational frame (coordination) is in-
volved in the three relational responses that
constitute the analogical relational network;
that is, the two similar relations participate in
a frame of coordination because they are
coordinate or similar. In contrast, relating
difference relations to difference relations
seems to parallel a less common analogical
structure (e.g., ‘‘he is to his brother as chalk is
to cheese’’; see Figure 1, lower panel). In this
case, two generic relational frames (coordina-
tion and distinction) are involved in the
relational network; that is, the two difference
relations participate in a frame of coordina-
tion because they are distinct or different.
In the study reported by Barnes et al.
(1997), participants were first trained, using
a standard matching-to-sample (MTS) pro-
cedure, in the following conditional discrimi-
nations: A1-B1, A2-B2, A3-B3, A4-B4, A1-C1,
A2-C2, A3-C3, and A4-C4. Participants were
then tested for the formation of four derived
three-element frames of coordination: A1-B1-
C1, A2-B2-C2, A3-B3-C3, and A4-B4-C4. Sub-
sequently, during the (critical) relating-rela-
tions test phase, participants related com-
pound comparisons to compound samples.
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the relating of relations. Upper panel: Conceptualizing the analogy ‘‘cat is to dog
as apple is to orange’’ in terms of the frame of coordination between two derived frames of similarity/coordination. Lower
panel: Conceptualizing the analogy ‘‘he is to his brother as chalk is to cheese’’ in terms of the frame of coordination
between two derived difference relations.
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These compounds comprised two stimulus
elements that were either from the same
derived relation (e.g., B1C1) and thus were
relationally similar, or comprised two elements
that were from two different derived relations
(e.g., B1C2) and thus were relationally differ-
ent. All participants, including a 9-year-old
boy, demonstrated similar–similar (e.g., B1C1-
B3C3) and different–different (e.g., B1C2-
B3C4) relational responding. These two pat-
terns of responding provide, according to
RFT, models of two different types of analogy.
In conceptualizing analogy in terms of
relating derived relations, RFT has generated
a growing body of empirical research into
various aspects of analogical reasoning in both
adults and children (e.g., Carpentier, Smeets,
& Barnes-Holmes, 2002, 2003; Carpentier,
Smeets, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2004;
Stewart et al., 2002; see Stewart & Barnes-
Holmes, 2004, for a review). In all of these
studies, however, performance measures al-
ways have been restricted to response accuracy
(e.g. percentage correct). Reaction time (RT)
and neurophysiological measures of relating
relations, however, never have been recorded.
The current research constitutes a first step
towards filling this empirical gap in the
literature.
In conducting a chronometric study of the
relating of relations, it is reasonable to ask
what predictions RFT might make. All things
being equal, RT differences between similar–
similar and different–different relational re-
sponding might be expected because the
number of distinct relational frames differs
across the two relational networks (see Steele
& Hayes, 1991). The different–different ana-
logical network involves placing two different
relations in a frame of coordination with each
other. That is, two separate relational frames
or response classes (distinction and coordina-
tion) are being employed to produce the
correct relational response. In contrast, the
similar–similar analogical network involves
placing two frames of coordination in a frame
of coordination with each other. This relation-
al network only makes use of one generic
relational frame—coordination. One might
expect, therefore, that different–different re-
sponding will produce longer reaction times
than similar–similar responding, because two
behavioral classes are required in the former
case, but only one is needed in the latter.
Testing this prediction was the primary pur-
pose of Experiment 1 (see the General
Discussion for an important caveat concerning
this prediction).
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was a partial replication of
Experiment 1 reported by Barnes et al. (1997).
The two most important differences were as
follows. First, RTs were recorded for all relating-
relations test trials. Second, a speed-contingent
condition was added (cf. Holth & Arntzen,
2000; Imam, 2001). If correct speed-contingent
responding is observed, then the current re-
lating-relations model will be further validated
in that natural-language analogical reasoning
often occurs rapidly (Klein, 1987). Experiment
2 replicated Experiment 1, but both RTs and
electroencephalograms (EEGs) were recorded
during the relating-relations test.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-four individuals, 10 males and 14
females, agreed to participate. Ages ranged
from 18 to 49 years (mean 5 24.9). All
participants were 1st-year undergraduates at
the National University of Ireland, Maynooth.
Twelve participants were assigned to the speed-
contingent condition and 12 were assigned to
the speed noncontingent condition. The
majority (91.7%) of participants failed to
complete the entire experiment in one ses-
sion, and were called back on subsequent days.
On these days, participants were reexposed to
experimental phases that they already had
completed (to preserve previously established
performances). All participants were asked not
to discuss their participation with anyone.
Apparatus and Materials
Standard DellH PCs (Pentium 4H) with
standard 14 in. screens displayed three-letter
words on white squares (6 cm by 5 cm), which
were set against a light-grey background.
Stimulus presentation and the recording of
responses, including RTs, were controlled by
a custom-made MicrosoftH Visual Basic 6.0E
training and testing program, written by the
first author. Self-adhesive stickers were placed
on four response keys on the computer
keyboard. The on-screen sample and compar-
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ison stimuli were 12 nonsense syllables (FUB,
JOM, MAU, DAX, ROG, CUG, PAF, KIB, BEH,
YIM, ZID, and VEK) taken from Barnes et al.
(1997). For ease of communication in this
article, each syllable will be referred to using
an alphanumeric label (A1, B1, C1, A2, B2, C2,
A3, B3, C3, A4, B4, or C4); participants never
saw these labels. For each participant, the
nonsense syllables were assigned randomly to
their alphanumeric labels.
Delayed Matching-to-Sample
A delayed, arbitrary matching-to-sample
(MTS) training and testing procedure was
employed. On any given trial, the sample
stimulus first appeared center-screen. After
the space bar was pressed, the sample dis-
appeared and the screen remained blank for
400 ms. The four comparison stimuli then
appeared, one in each corner of the screen.
Participants selected one of the comparisons
by pressing the corresponding keyboard key:
‘‘R’’ for the top left comparison stimulus, ‘‘U’’
for top right, ‘‘C’’ for bottom left, and ‘‘N’’ for
the bottom right comparison. The screen then
cleared and during training, correct responses
were followed immediately by the word ‘‘cor-
rect’’ in the center of the screen (accompa-
nied by an audible beep). Choosing any of the
other three comparisons immediately pro-
duced the word ‘‘wrong’’ center-screen (with
no accompanying sound). Locations of cor-
rect/incorrect comparison stimuli were coun-
terbalanced across trials. Feedback (i.e., cor-
rect or wrong) remained on screen for 2,000 ms
and after a further 2,000 ms intertrial interval
(ITI), during which the screen remained blank,
a new trial began. During all testing phases,
feedback was omitted and the ITI followed
directly after a response was made.
During the relating-relations testing phase,
sample and comparison stimuli were com-
pounds comprising two stimulus elements
presented side-by-side separated by a 1 cm
space (e.g., ‘‘BEH DAX’’). On each trial, two
comparisons were presented after pressing the
space bar. These comparisons were placed in
the bottom two corners of the screen and were
selected by pressing either the C or N keys (all
other keys were disabled). Again, comparison
location was counterbalanced across trials.
In the speed-contingent condition, partici-
pants were required to select a comparison
stimulus within 3 s of comparison onset in all
training and testing trials. If no response was
made within this time, the words ‘‘too late!’’
appeared center-screen and an incorrect re-
sponse was recorded. In the speed-noncontin-
gent condition, the computer simply waited
until the participant made a response on each
trial.
Procedure
Participants were studied individually in
a small testing room. At the beginning of each
session, participants were given a written in-
struction sheet that described the matching-to-
sample task, including which keys to press to
select the comparison stimuli (all verbatim
instructions used in both Experiments 1 and 2
are available from the first author upon
request). The experimenter, after answering
any further queries, then left the room.
Matching-to-Sample Training
Eight MTS tasks were used to train partici-
pants in two sets of related conditional
discriminations (see Figure 2, top panel). That
is, A-B relations: A1-B1, A2-B2, A3-B3, and A4-
B4, and A-C relations: A1-C1, A2-C2, A3-C3,
and A4-C4. Order of presentation (of the two
sets) was counterbalanced across participants.
The four tasks of each set were presented in
a quasi-random order in four-trial blocks (i.e.,
each of the four tasks was presented once
within each block), until participants pro-
duced a minimum of eight consecutively
correct responses. After training to criterion
on both the A-B and A-C relations, all eight
tasks were then presented in a quasi-random
order in eight-trial blocks (each of the eight
tasks was presented once within each block),
until participants produced a minimum of 16
consecutively correct responses. Participants
then proceeded directly to the derived rela-
tions test.
Derived Relations Test
At the beginning of this phase, a message
appeared on the computer screen informing
participants that the computer would no
longer indicate if their responses were correct
or wrong. Twenty-four different MTS tasks
were used during this phase of the experi-
ment; eight of these tested for the directly
trained relations described above, eight tested
for the derived mutually entailed relations
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Fig. 2. A schematic representation of the matching-to-sample tasks, including correct responses, which were used in
the three phases of Experiment 1: matching-to-sample training, derived relations test, and relating-relations test.
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(i.e., four B-A and four C-A relations; Figure 2,
second panel), and the final eight tasks tested
for the derived combinatorially entailed rela-
tions (four B-C and four C-B relations; Figure 2,
third panel). The 24 tasks were presented,
without feedback, in a random order in a single
24-trial block (i.e., each task was presented
once within a block). Participants were re-
quired to produce at least 23 of 24 correct
responses to pass the derived relations test.
Failure to reach this criterion resulted in the
message: ‘‘You may take a break now’’
appearing center-screen. When participants
clicked on a ‘‘continue’’ button with the
mouse they were returned to the MTS training
phase. Following successful retraining, partic-
ipants were reexposed to the derived relations
test, and if necessary, were retrained and
retested until they met the pass criterion
($ 23 of 24 correct responses). Upon reaching
the pass criterion, participants proceeded
directly to the relating-relations test.
Relating-Relations Test
At the beginning of this phase, a message
appeared on the computer screen informing
participants that only two choices would be
presented on each trial and that each stimulus
box would contain two nonsense words (rather
than one). Participants were instructed to rest
their hands comfortably at the bottom of the
keyboard and to place the left and right index
fingers on the marked C and N keys, re-
spectively, and to use the right thumb to press
the space bar (to remove the sample stimulus).
Participants also were instructed to press the
left key to choose the left comparison and the
right key to choose the right comparison; the
other two marked keys, R and U, were inactive
throughout the relating-relations test.
Participants were presented with one pair of
nonsense syllables as a sample and two pairs of
nonsense syllables as comparisons. Each pair of
syllables was either from the same derived
relation (e.g., B1C1) or from two different
derived relations (e.g., B2C1). The relating-
relations test consisted of a single block of 32
trials during which eight different MTS tasks
(see Figure 2, bottom panel) were presented in
a quasi-random order such that each task was
presented four times. Consistent with Barnes et
al. (1997), four of the eight tasks were labelled
‘‘foils,’’ defined as trials in which incorrect
comparisons contained an element that also was
present in the sample. The sample stimuli were
B1C1, B2C2, B1C2, and B2C1 (for the four
nonfoil tasks) and B1C1, B2C2, B4C3, and B3C4
(for the four foil tasks). The comparison stimuli
for the four nonfoil tasks were B3C3 and B3C4,
and the comparison stimuli for the four foil
tasks were B4C4 and B1C2.
Relating derived relations was defined as
follows: (a) given a sample that contained two
elements from the same derived relation (e.g.,
B1C1), the correct comparison contained two
elements from another same relation (e.g.,
B3C3); and (b) given a sample that contained
two elements from different derived relations
(e.g., B1C2), the correct comparison con-
tained two elements from another two differ-
ent derived relations (e.g., B3C4). Two of the
eight relating-relations tasks were labelled
‘‘similar–similar,’’ two ‘‘different–different,’’
another two ‘‘similar–similar with foil,’’ and
the final two ‘‘different–different with foil’’
(see Figure 2, bottom panel).
To pass the relating-relations test, a mini-
mum of 29 of 32 predicted responses were
required. At the end of a 32-trial block,
regardless of performance, a message ap-
peared center-screen asking the participant
to report to the experimenter. If the prear-
ranged session-time had not fully elapsed at
this stage, and the participant had failed to
reach criterion, she or he was cycled through
the entire procedure again, beginning with
matching-to-sample training. If the participant
had failed, and the session-time had elapsed,
a subsequent session-time was arranged. If the
participant had passed, Experiment 1 was
complete for this individual.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Training and Testing Exposures
The mean number of training and testing
cycles required to pass the relating-relations
test was 5.8 in the speed-contingent condition
and 3.5 in the speed-noncontingent condition;
this difference approached, but did not reach
significance, F(1, 22) 5 3.81, p 5 .064.
Relating-Relations Test: Reaction Time Measures
Individual RTs were measured from the
point of onset of the two comparison stimuli
to the participant’s first key press (either C or
N). Only RTs for experimenter-defined correct
responses from passed relating-relations tests are
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presented in the current report. Responses of
10 s or over in the speed-noncontingent con-
dition were removed as outliers.
Themean RTs and standard errors for each of
the four relating-relations trial types (similar–
similar, different–different, similar–similar with
foil, and different–different with foil) were
calculated across the 24 participants in the two
speed conditions (see Figure 3).MeanRTs in the
speed-noncontingent condition approached or
exceeded twice the duration of the RTs in the
speed-contingent condition, across all four trial
types. Furthermore, mean RTs for similar–
similar trial types were shorter than for differ-
ent–different trial types in both speed conditions
and for both foil and nonfoil trials.
A mixed 23 4 analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted to examine the effect of the
speed contingency (between-participant vari-
able), the effect of the four trial types (within-
participant variable), and any possible interac-
tion effect between these two variables. A
statistically significant main effect for speed
condition, F(1, 22) 5 29.21, p ,.001, gp
2 5
.57, and trial type, F(3, 66) 5 7.1, p , .001, gp
2
5 .24, was found but no significant interaction
effect was detected, F(3, 66) 5 1.3, p 5 .278. A
series of Fisher’s PLSD post hoc tests were
then conducted, comparing RTs across the
four relating-relations trial types (see Table 1).
Similar–similar responses, in both speed con-
ditions, were significantly faster than differ-
ent–different responses. The RTs for the foil
trials did not differ significantly from those of
their nonfoil counterparts.
Relating-Relations: Accuracy Measures
In addition to RT measures of relating-
relations trial types, accuracy measures also
were compared. Because the accuracy of these
four trial types would be almost identical for
Fig. 3. Mean reaction times (in ms), including standard error bars, for the four relating-relations trial types as
a function of experimental condition in Experiment 1.
Table 1
Results of Fisher’s PLSD post hoc tests comparing reaction
times for the four relating-relations trial types in both
speed conditions of Experiment 1, with percentage of
individual participants conforming to the direction of the
statistically significant effects.
Post hoc comparisons Significance (p) %
Similar–similar vs.
different–different .027 83.3
Similar–similar vs.
similar–similar (foil) .744
Similar–similar vs.
different–different (foil) .001 83.3
Different–different vs.
similar–similar (foil) .012 75.0
Different–different vs.
different–different (foil) .176
Similar–similar (foil) vs.
different–different (foil) .0002 83.3
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the final (i.e., passed) exposure to the relating-
relations test, only participants’ acquisition data
(from relating-relations tests prior to the final
successful test) were analyzed. Twenty-one of
the 24 participants failed at least one relating-
relations test before completing the experi-
ment, and thus their acquisition data could be
analyzed (the three remaining participants
who passed the first relating relations test were
from the speed-noncontingent condition). For
the analysis, four values were calculated for
each participant: the total number of correct
responses (out of eight) made during similar–
similar and different–different test trials with
and without foils. If a participant failed more
than one relating-relations test, the mean
(rather than the total) number of correct
responses across the failed tests was calculated
for each of the four conditions. The accuracy
data averaged across the 21 participants is
shown in Figure 4. Apart from one trial type
(similar–similar with foil), imposing the speed-
contingency appeared to affect accuracy neg-
atively, but only slightly. No other consistent
and obvious trial type effects emerged for the
accuracy measure.
A mixed 2 3 4 ANOVA was conducted to
examine the effect of the speed contingency,
the effect of the four trial types, and a possible
interaction between these two variables. The
speed contingency did not reach significance,
F(1, 19) 5 1.19, p 5 .290, nor did trial type,
F(3, 57) 5 1.47, p 5 .234, nor was any
interaction between these variables detected,
F(3, 57) 5 .93, p 5 .434. In effect, the accuracy
measure was not affected, at a statistically
significant level, by either the speed-contin-
gency or the relating-relations trial type.
Summary
Experiment 1 produced three clear effects.
First, the results showed that average RTs for
different–different trials were significantly
longer than for similar–similar trials—this
difference was not affected by imposing
a speed-contingency, nor was it affected by
the foils. Second, adding the speed-contingen-
cy significantly reduced RTs across all four trial
types. Third, accuracy measures derived from
the relating-relations acquisition data were not
significantly affected by speed condition or
trial type.
The results of Experiment 1 provide chro-
nometric evidence for the RFT model of
analogical reasoning in that longer RTs were
recorded when participants were required to
relate derived relations that involved two
generic classes of relational responding (Same
Fig. 4. Acquisition data averaged across 21 participants showing the total or mean number of correct responses (out
of eight), including standard error bars, across the four relating-relations trial types, as a function of experimental
condition in Experiment 1.
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and Different), rather than only one (Same).
There are, however, other measures that might
be used to investigate the relating of derived
relations as a model of analogical reasoning.
One of these involves the use of EEG signals in
the form of event-related potentials. The
primary purpose of Experiment 2 was to
commence such work.
EXPERIMENT 2
Due to recent technological advances in the
measurement of brain events, it now is possible
to study verbal processes and hemispheric
specialization with greater precision than can
be accomplished with behavioral measures
alone (Andreassi, 2000). Event-related poten-
tials (ERPs) constitute one such technological
innovation (see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005).
The ERP measure is constituted from averaged
EEG segments, time-locked to some repeated-
ly-presented stimulus event, and the signals are
typically recorded from various positions
around the scalp.
Although a literature search failed to find
any ERP studies investigating analogical rea-
soning, alternative neuroscience methodolo-
gies have been employed in this area. For
example, a recent positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET) study found left-hemispheric neu-
ral activation while participants engaged in
a figural analogy task (Wharton et al., 2000).
This activity was specifically located in the left
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC). Wharton
et al. found little or no accompanying right-
hemispheric activity and so concluded that
even figural analogies are processed linguisti-
cally in the left PFC. A later study examined
the effects of repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) of the left and right
dorsolateral PFC on figural analogical reason-
ing in 16 normal adults (Boroojerdi, Phipps,
Kopylev, Wharton, Cohen, & Grafman, 2001).
Stimulation over the left PFC led to signifi-
cantly reduced reaction times in the analogy
task; right PFC stimulation did not. The
authors concluded that left PFC is relevant
for analogical reasoning.
Another recent study in the area (Luo et al.,
2003), used functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) in the analysis of verbal
analogy, and found bilateral hemispheric acti-
vation. Specifically, the left and right PFCs
were activated, as well as bilateral temporal
structures such as the fusiform gyri and basal
ganglia. Because some analogies in Luo et al’s.
study (although all verbal) may have been
more visually than linguistically based, the
authors suggested that the observed bilateral
activation was not entirely surprising.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the dearth of
ERP research on verbal analogical reasoning is
the lack of a precise methodology for studying
such behavior in this way. The interpretation
of ERP data generated by analogies embedded
in sentences, for example, may be difficult
because of confounds such as syntax, context,
and a heavy load on semantic working memory
(e.g., Weisbrod et al., 1999). Insofar as analo-
gical reasoning, as well as sentence processing,
is heavily dependent on working memory,
a difficulty would arise in separating out these
two activities in an ERP analysis. Furthermore,
words used in these sentences would of course
carry preestablished semantic associations that
would be difficult to control for.
The model of analogy reported in Experi-
ment 1, however, lends itself quite well to an
ERP analysis for the following reasons. First,
the relating-relations test for analogical re-
sponding involves discrete stimulus presentations,
the effects of which ERPs are specifically
designed to measure (Holcomb, 1988; Kutas,
1993). Furthermore, because the current
model involves isolated relational responses,
confounding variables such as syntax, context,
and a heavy load on working memory are
minimized. Finally, the stimuli used in the
relating-relations model are arbitrary nonsense
syllables, and thus the probability of confound-
ing preexperimental semantic histories is
much reduced (see Barnes-Holmes et al.,
2005).
The findings of Experiment 1 suggest that
similar–similar and different–different rela-
tional responding are functionally distinct.
Given the RT difference between the relating
of similar versus difference relations, it would
seem reasonable to expect that such differ-
ences also would be reflected at the neuro-
physiological level. Experiment 2 was a partial
replication of Experiment 1 and focused on
measuring the electrophysiological correlates
(ERPs) of similar–similar versus different–
different analogical responding. Only the
speed-contingent condition was employed,
thus providing a fixed and discreet time-
window for the ERP analyses. Because previous
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PET, rTMS, and fMRI studies (mentioned
above) have shown analogical reasoning (both
verbal and figural) to be associated with the
frontal regions of the cortex, Experiment 2
measured ERPs from six of the standard
frontal sites located on the left and right
hemispheres.
METHOD
Participants
Fourteen right-handed individuals, 5 males
and 9 females, attending the National Univer-
sity of Ireland, Maynooth, completed the
experiment. Ages ranged from 18 to 49 years
with a mean age of 23 years. None of the
participants had a history of psychiatric or
neurological disorder.
Apparatus and Materials
The experiment was conducted in a small,
dimly lit laboratory in the Department of
Psychology at the National University of Ire-
land, Maynooth. The stimuli and materials
used were identical to those of Experiment 1.
In order to record the EEG measures during
the relating-relations task, a Brain Amp MR
(Class IIa, Type BF) with approved control
software (Brain Vision Recorder 1.0), and
electrode cap (BrainCap/BrainCap MR) was
used. The Brain Amp was controlled by a DellH
personal computer with a Pentium 4H pro-
cessor. The ERP data were analyzed using
approved analysis software (Brain Vision Ana-
lyzer 1.0). Hardware and software were man-
ufactured and supplied by Brain Products
GmbH, Munich, Germany.
Pretraining and Pretesting
The procedure was identical to that of the
speed-contingent condition in Experiment 1.
To ensure accurate performance on the day of
recording, and to reduce participant fatigue
during ERP recording, all participants un-
derwent MTS training and derived relations
testing across one or more days immediately
prior to the ERP recording phase.
Training and Testing
On the day of ERP measurement, partici-
pants first were attached to the Brain Amp and
then were reexposed to the MTS training and
derived relations testing before proceeding for
the first time to the relating-relations test. If
necessary, participants were cycled and re-
cycled through the entire three-stage proce-
dure until they passed the relating-relations
test. The entire session, including electrode
placement, lasted on average 1 hr and 30 min.
Only the ERP data from the final successful
exposure to the relating-relations test were
analyzed.
Recordings
Evoked potentials were recorded and ana-
lyzed from six sintered AG/AG-CI scalp
electrodes positioned according to the in-
ternational 10-20 system. The primary purpose
of the ERP recordings was to determine if
differential EEG patterns would be observed
between the two relating-relations trial types in
the frontal cortex. The six frontal sites chosen
for recording were Fp1, Fp2, F3, F4, F7, and
F8. The central vertex electrode was used as
reference and the FPz as ground. Two addi-
tional electrodes recorded vertical and hori-
zontal eye movements. Amplifier resolution
was 0.1 mV (range, 6 3.2768 mV) and the
bandwidth set between 0.5 and 62.5 Hz with
sampling rate of 250 Hz. The notch filter was
set at 50 Hz. All electrode impedances were at
or below 5 KV. The EEG was collected
continuously and edited off-line. Average ERPs
were calculated across the similar–similar and
different–different test trials.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The mean RTs and standard errors for
correct responses on the final (successful)
exposure to the relating-relations test, for each
of the four trial types, were calculated across
13 participants (see Figure 5); the RT data for
one of the participants was lost due to
experimenter error. Consistent with the results
of Experiment 1, mean RTs for similar–similar
trial types were lower than for different–
different trial types, and the foils appeared to
have no effect on RT. A one-way repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted to compare
RTs across the four trial types, and this proved
to be significant, F(3, 36) 5 5.54, p 5 .003, gp
2
5 .32. A series of Fisher’s PLSD post hoc tests
were then conducted, comparing RTs among
the four relating-relations trial types (see
Table 2). These tests indicated that similar–
similar responses were significantly faster than
different–different responses, but foil trials did
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not differ significantly from their nonfoil
counterparts.
The continuous EEG signals for each of the
14 participants were filtered (0.53 Hz, time
constant 5 0.3 s, 24 dB/octave roll-off) and
then segmented for similar–similar and differ-
ent–different trial types. Standard and foil
trials were collapsed to reduce noise for the
ERP analysis. The segments were divided into
1,700 ms epochs commencing 100 ms before
onset of the comparison stimuli. Vertical and
horizontal ocular artifacts were then cor-
rected, and any segments on which EEG or
electro-ocular activity exceeded 6 75 mV were
rejected. The remaining segments then were
baseline corrected (using the 100 ms presti-
mulus interval) and finally averaged for
similar–similar and different–different trial
types.
The grand average waveforms for each of
the six frontal electrode sites (Fp1, Fp2, F3, F4,
F7, and F8) for similar–similar (light lines)
versus different–different trials (dark lines) are
shown in Figure 6. Visual inspection of these
waveforms indicated little evidence of differ-
ential activity for the two trial types until
approximately 1,000 ms following comparison
onset. Specifically, the different–different
trials, relative to the similar–similar trials,
produced greater negativity on the left sites
(left panels) and more positivity on the right
sites (right panels). This differential between
trial types was more evident for the left than
for the right sites, and the largest difference
was observed at the dorsolateral prefrontal
regions (F7 and F8).
For the purposes of statistical analysis, the
ERP waveforms were divided into three tem-
poral regions: 200 to 600 ms, 600 to 1,000 ms,
and 1,000 to 1,400 ms. The area dimensions
(mV 3 ms) for each waveform for each
Fig. 5. Mean reaction times (in ms), including standard error bars, for the four relating-relations trial types in
Experiment 2.
Table 2
Results of Fisher’s PLSD post hoc tests comparing reaction
times for the four relating-relations trial types in
Experiment 2, with percentage of individual participants
conforming to the direction of the statistically significant
effects.
Post hoc comparisons Significance (p) %
Similar–similar vs.
different–different .005 84.6
Similar–similar vs.
similar–similar (foil) .819
Similar–similar vs.
different–different (foil) .005 84.6
Different–different vs.
similar–similar (foil) .009 76.9
Different–different vs.
different–different (foil) .976
Similar–similar (foil) vs.
different–different (foil) .009 76.9
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participant recorded during these regions
were calculated, yielding either positive or
negative values with respect to the 0 mV level. A
four-way ANOVA was then conducted with
laterality (left and right), location (Fp1-Fp2,
F3-F4, F7-F8), interval (200 to 600 ms, 600 to
1,000 ms, 1,000 to 1,400 ms), and trial type
(similar–similar and different–different) as
repeated measures factors. The ANOVA re-
vealed significant main effects for location,
F(2, 26) 5 7.75, p 5 .002, gp
2 5 0.37, and
interval, F(2, 26)5 10.82, p, .001, gp
25 0.45,
but not for laterality, F(1, 13) 5 .002, p 5 .962,
or trial type, F(1, 13) 5 .786, p 5 .392.
Interaction effects were also found: interval
by location, F(4, 52)5 22.34, p5,.001, gp
25
0.63, and interval by trial type, F(2, 26) 5 7.05,
p 5 .004, gp
2 5 0.35, were both statistically
significant.
Given the significant intervallic interactions,
three 3-way repeated measures ANOVAs were
required to analyse each interval separately. In
the first (200 to 600 ms) and second (600 to
1,000 ms) intervals, location was the only
significant effect, F(2, 26) 5 14.04, p , .001,
gp
25 .52 and F(2, 26)5 11.64, p, .001, gp
25
.47, respectively. For both intervals, Sheffe post
hoc tests then were conducted to compare the
three frontal regions of both hemispheres. The
tests showed that the Fp1-Fp2 regions differed
significantly from both the F3-F4 (first interval,
p , .001; second interval, p , .002) and F7-F8
(first interval, p , .001; second interval, p 5
.001) regions but that the F3-F4 and F7-F8
regions did not differ significantly (first in-
terval, p 5 .862; second interval, p 5 .992). To
summarize, the waveforms between 200 and
1,000 ms for the Fp1 and Fp2 sites were
Fig. 6. Grand average waveforms for similar–similar (thin lines) and different–different (thick lines) derived
relational responding at electrode sites Fp1, Fp2 (top panel), F3, F4 (middle panel), and F7, F8 (bottom panel).
Comparison compounds were presented at 0 ms.
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significantly more positive than for the F3-F4
and F7-F8 sites.
The third interval (1,000 to 1,400 ms) was
not significant for location, F(2, 26) 5 .36, p 5
.700, but did reveal a significant main effect
for trial type, F(1, 13) 5 8.45, p 5 .012, gp
2 5
.39. There also were two significant interac-
tions: laterality by trial type, F(1, 13) 5 8.84,
p 5 .011, gp
2 5 .40, and laterality by location
by trial type, F(2, 26) 5 8.80, p 5 .001, gp
2 5
.40. Two 2-way repeated measures ANOVAs
thus were used to explore location and trial
type effects in the right and left hemispheric
final intervals, respectively. The right-hemi-
spheric ANOVA approached, but did not
reach significance, F(1, 13) 5 4.29, p 5 .059,
gp
25 .25. In the left hemisphere, trial type was
significant, F(1, 13) 5 11.32, p 5 .005, gp
2 5
.47, and it also interacted with location, F(2,
26) 5 5.59, p , .01, gp
2 5 .30. To investigate
this interaction further, three separate analy-
ses were conducted for each left-hand site. The
three 1-way repeated measures ANOVAs were
all significant for trial type: Fp1, F(1, 13) 5
4.93, p , .05, gp
2 5 .27; F3, F(1, 13) 5 8.72,
p 5 .011, gp
2 5 .40; and F7, F(1, 13) 5 9.18,
p , .01, gp
2 5 .41. That is, different–different
analogical responses, in the left hemisphere
and for the final interval, were significantly
more negative than their accompanying simi-
lar–similar responses at all three left-frontal
sites. The percentage of individual participants
conforming to the direction of the statistically
significant effects for each of the three sites
was as follows: Fp1 5 57.1; F3 5 85.7; F7 5
85.7.
The results of Experiment 2 showed that, in
the context of a speed-contingency, similar–
similar responses were faster than different–
different responses, and furthermore that this
difference was not affected by foils. The ERP
analyses indicated overall differences between
waveforms in the three time intervals as well as
overall differences between waveforms in the
Fp1-Fp2, F3-F4, and F7-F8 areas; moving in
a roughly anterior-posterior direction across
the prefrontal cortex, slow-wave amplitudes
increased and waveforms typically became
more negative. Significant differences between
similar–similar versus different–different re-
sponses were found for the left hemisphere
beginning around 1,000 ms after comparison
onset. This difference increased as a function
of electrode location; moving in an anterior-
posterior direction (i.e., from Fp1 to F3 and
then F7) different–different waveforms be-
came increasingly more negative than simi-
lar–similar waveforms. Interestingly, although
only approaching significance, the same pat-
tern was observed for the right hemisphere,
except that the differential relation reversed;
similar–similar waveforms were slightly more
negative than different–different waveforms.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In both Experiments 1 and 2, significant RT
differences were found between the two re-
lational networks (i.e., similar–similar versus
different–different). Furthermore, this effect
was observed within a compressed 3-s response
window. These findings confirm the predic-
tions of RFT (Hayes et al., 2001). That is, all
things being equal, a different–different re-
lational network should generate longer RTs
than a similar–similar network because the
former involves responding in accordance with
a similar relation between two difference
relations (i.e., two distinct relational frames
are involved: distinction and coordination); in
contrast, similar–similar responses involve re-
sponding in accordance with a similar relation
between two similar relations (i.e., only one
relational frame is involved: coordination).
Although the current data support the RFT
prediction that multiple stimulus relations will
produce longer RTs than single stimulus
relations (see Steele & Hayes, 1991), it is
important to recognize that RFT is an operant
theory and thus its predictions always are
constrained by historical and contextual vari-
ables. Recognizing this fact is particularly
important in the uncontrolled world of natural
language where an individual’s history of
derived relational responding typically is un-
known. Consider, for example, the analogy
‘‘midget is to giant as mouse is to elephant //
apple is to baseball.’’ According to RFT, this
analogy involves two comparative relations
(relative size) and a similar relation between
the two comparatives (see Lipkens, 1992), and
thus one might predict that it should produce
longer RTs than a similar–similar analogy.
Without knowing an individual’s history of
responding in accordance with such relational
networks, however, this prediction cannot be
made. It may be, for example, that such
comparative analogies are at a relatively high
448 DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES et al.
frequency in natural language and thus occur
rapidly for most members of the verbal
community. In this case, RT may be rendered
a relatively blunt instrument for separating out
different analogical networks.
The issue is further complicated because
RFT also would predict the current data based
on the history that was provided within the
experimental context itself. Specifically, the
participants were required to pass a test for the
frame of coordination before proceeding to
the relating-relations test, and thus the oper-
ant class of coordination, relative to distinc-
tion, may have been at a higher strength when
participants entered the relating-relations test.
Perhaps, therefore, subsequent exposures to
the relating-relations test would have removed
the RT difference between similar–similar and
different–different relational networks (see
Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004).
It is these very concerns about RT, as
a measure of derived relational responding,
that highlights the importance of exploring
alternative dependent variables such as ERP.
Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests that
ERPs may remain relatively sensitive to different
derived relational networks when RT does not
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004). Furthermore,
ERPs and indeed other neurophysiological
measures can be used to determine if RFT
models of human language and cognition
produce effects broadly similar to those seen
in neurocognitive research (see Barnes-Holmes
et al., 2005). If some degree of overlap is found,
then RFT as a behavioral theory of human
language and cognition will be strengthened.
Certainly, the data obtained in Experiment 2 of
the current study appear supportive.
Experiment 2 showed electrophysiological
activity associated with both similar–similar
and different–different relational responding
primarily in the dorsolateral prefrontal areas
(F7 and F8). Furthermore, it was in these areas
that the greatest differentials between relating
similar and difference relations were observed
(although only the left hemisphere proved to
be statistically significant). Interestingly, dif-
ferential waveforms in these areas only began
to emerge around 1,000 ms after presentation
of the two comparison stimuli. It seems likely
that for the first 1,000 ms, participants were
viewing and evaluating both (i.e., the correct
and incorrect) comparisons independently;
that is, without a view to immediately matching
them to the sample. Then, at around
1,000 ms, a reliable slow-wave negative de-
flection for F7 (i.e., an N1000 component)
was observed for different–different analogical
responses. Given the mean RT for this re-
sponse type in Experiment 2 (approximately
1,800 ms), the N1000 component likely re-
flected the point at which participants were
relating the difference comparison com-
pound, analogically, to the difference sample
compound. Insofar as this interpretation is
accurate, it took about 1 s for participants to
(covertly) relate difference relations.
Previous research in the neurocognitive
literature has shown negative ERP components
(e.g., N400) to be modulated by the ‘‘cloze
probability’’ (i.e., degree of expectedness) of
sentence-final words. For example, the sen-
tence, ‘‘it is hard to admit when one is asleep’’
elicits a more negative waveform than the
sentence ‘‘it is hard to admit when one is
wrong’’ (Kutas, 1993; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984).
Perhaps the negative waveforms elicited by
different–different relational responding in
Experiment 2 indicate that this analogical
network (e.g., ‘‘he is to his brother as chalk
is to cheese’’) is of low-probability relative to
a similar–similar network (e.g., ‘‘apple is to
orange as dog is to cat’’). In other words, low-
probability/unusual relational responses may
overlap functionally, to some extent, with
responses to sentences that end with a low-
probability word.
In Experiment 2, the bilateral prefrontal
brain regions, especially the dorsolateral areas,
were activated when participants engaged in
the relating of derived similar–similar and
different–different relations. Studies examin-
ing the neural substrates of natural-language
analogy have found activity in the same regions
(e.g., Luo et al., 2003). Interestingly, Experi-
ment 2 showed ERP effects in the right
hemisphere. Previous evidence suggests that
right-hemispheric activation is, in some ways,
special to analogical reasoning, especially
analogies of the verbal kind (Luo et al.,
2003). This evidence would seem to conflict
with the well-established finding that linguistic
processing, which clearly includes analogical
reasoning, occurs predominantly in the left
hemisphere. Certain verbal analogies may,
however, have inductive, metaphorical, or
‘‘open-ended’’ qualities (Luo et al., 2003)
leading to right-hemispheric prefrontal activa-
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tion (Bottini et al., 1994; Goel & Dolan, 2000).
Furthermore, deductive reasoning, in some
ways the opposite of analogical reasoning, has
yet to be associated with right-hemispheric
frontal activation (Goel, Gold, Kapur, &
Houle, 1998). Given the right-hemispheric
activation found in Experiment 2, the current
RFT model might have successfully captured
this inductive or open-ended quality of verbal
analogy. One issue that remains unresolved at
the present time, however, concerns the fact
that the difference between the similar–similar
and different–different waveforms was re-
versed across the two hemispheres, although
the right hemisphere difference only ap-
proached significance. Whether this lateral
asymmetry also would be observed if a non-
arbitrary relating-relations task (i.e., a figural
analogy) were used remains to be seen (see
Luo et al., 2003). In any case, until additional
data are gathered with a larger sample, the
current lateral asymmetry effect should be
interpreted with caution.
The current research aimed to test the RFT
model of analogical reasoning based on the
relating of derived relations. The behavioral and
neurophysiological data from Experiments 1
and 2 support the RFT prediction that similar–
similar and different–different relational re-
sponses involve functionally distinct classes of
behavior. The current research also shows that
a behavior-analytic model of analogical reason-
ing can be generated in the laboratory, and that
the model can be tested using chronometric
and neurophysiological measures.
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